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Abstract 
Policy objectives for Southeast Asian regionalism had been evolving since the 
end of the Second World War.  Economic development viewed as essential for 
establishing peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the links between 
development and security were evident in the elaboration of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  Also evident was the second-line 
support provided by external powers.  While ASEAN was a regional 
initiative that came out of the Bangkok talks to end Confrontation, Western 
governments had been formulating regional cooperation policies in Southeast 
Asia decades prior.  Economic development viewed as essential for containing 
communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region.  
Growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs 
with external support.  This would then expand to some form of collective 
security led by the Southeast Asian nations themselves.  Regionalism viewed 
as one way of providing economic assistance to newly independent nations 
without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs.  Therefore, 
the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign 
power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development 
with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the 
region from the post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the 
aftermath of the war in Vietnam. 
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Introduction 
At the end of the Second World War, 
early efforts towards Southeast Asian 
regionalism emerged from Southeast Asian 
nations seeking to achieve peace and 
stability, economic development and 
policies of self-reliance.  Western 
governments too were pursuing their 
policies on regional cooperation for similar 
outcomes.  For the United States (U.S.) 
especially, such agreement would provide 
stability for a grouping of non-communist 
nations without the appearance of Western 
support, as well as a multilateral umbrella 
under which bilateral relationships between 
the West and Southeast Asian countries 
would thrive and prosper.  These policies 
have often overlooked when tracing the 
post-war evolution of Southeast Asian 
regionalism as the focus of this topic has 
tended only to highlight the role played by 
the regional nations themselves.  Indeed, 
officials such as Abu Bakar Lubis, the private 
secretary to Indonesian Foreign Affairs 
Minister Adam Malik, have promoted this 
perception, denying that formal regional 
cooperation was the result of an American 
idea or action (Anwar, 1994, pp. 49-57).  
Additionally, perceptions of the role of 
regional cooperation have highlighted 
economic and social issues, rather than any 
security benefits, missing the importance of 
regionalism as a vehicle for promoting both 
economic development and safety policies of 
regional and external powers. 
Western governments initially 
sought to secure regional peace and 
cooperation through the United Nations 
(UN).  Washington was interested in 
collaboration among groups in the UN 
where there was mutual interest, such as 
regional cooperation. Australia and New 
Zealand too saw the benefit of such an 
arrangement, taking the initiative to seek 
consultation with the U.S. on the future of 
the Pacific region at the end of the war.  
Britain was also supportive of the idea of 
regional cooperation and looked at 
developing a policy for its colonial areas.  
Both the British and the Australians believed 
that some form of regional cooperation was 
much preferable to a post-war mandate 
system (Letter, Evatt to Johnson, 1944).  
Securing support from the region was crucial 
for officials who were keen to avoid direct 
interference in the affairs of governing 
bodies, and within Asia, some states also 
backed the idea of closer cooperation, 
especially those that supported 
decolonization, but not pro-communist 
independence movements. 
However, regional cooperation could 
only succeed if Southeast Asian nations 
themselves agreed that there was a need for 
closer relations and would work together.  
This need did come from the common fear of 
China’s domination in the region and 
concern for economic development, 
especially once Western interests reduced.  
The creation of formal regional cooperation 
came with the establishment of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), a move that was only possible 
through regional initiatives from the 
founding member states.  Indeed, the 
creation of ASEAN attributed to efforts from 
the countries in the region, especially 
ASEAN’s conception was a direct result of 
the Malaysian-Indonesian talks that ended 
Confrontation, the conflict between these 
two nations.  However, Western policies did 
contribute to the evolution of regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia, reflecting the 
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combined efforts of foreign power support 
for Asian initiatives. 
Early Initiatives 
On 4 July 1949, Philippine President 
Quirino made a speech outlining the need 
for a ‘Pacific Union, a real union of peoples 
around the Pacific on the basis for common 
counsel and assistance.’  Quirino then sent a 
letter of instructions to General Romulo, 
Philippine Diplomat and President of the 
UN General Assembly at the time, outlining 
his plans for such an organization.  Romulo 
responded and proposed that Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, 
Australia, India, Burma, Ceylon and 
Indonesia organize a political and economic 
union aimed at containing ‘Russo-Chinese’ 
Communism, while also denouncing 
European imperialism.  Britain, France, the 
Netherlands and the U.S. would at first 
excluded from such an organization.  After 
some form of grouping emerged, an offer of 
economic cooperation with the U.S. would 
pursue.  Then, if Communism could contain, 
a joint appeal for American military aid 
could be considered (Memo, for Butterworth 
and Fisher, 1949). 
The links between economic 
development and security had been evident 
from the beginning of the UN and had 
resulted in the establishment of some 
agencies such as the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), amongst others.  In early 1947, 
ECOSOC created regional commissions to 
encourage development, and one of these 
bodies was the UN Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which 
was established on 19 March 1947.  The 
membership of ECAFE included both Asian 
countries and non-regional members such as 
France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, 
Britain, and the U.S.  As the Cold War 
intensified, the Australian Government 
particularly, promoted the commission as a 
forum for non-communist governments and 
capitalist development (Mitcham, 2012, p. 
191 & 1930). 
However, Washington and several 
other countries were cautious about 
Philippine overtures towards the 
development of a Pacific Union.  When 
General Romulo tried to undertake 
preliminary discussions on the idea with 
various diplomatic representations at the 
UN, several nations indicated that American 
policy would largely influence their position.  
Following this, Romulo attempted to secure 
a commitment from Washington to support 
the participation in a Southeast Asian 
meeting.  The response from the State 
Department was that while the U.S. would 
be sympathetic to the principle of a 
Southeast Asian association, the success of 
any such group would have to be generated 
spontaneously within the area (Memo, 
Secretary of State and Butterworth, 1950). 
Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to 
promote the idea of Asian regionalism to 
counter anti-Western forces. This idea 
reflected in support for the development of 
the Mekong River Basin.  Post-war interest in 
developing the area came out of French-Thai 
negotiations to settle a territorial dispute.  In 
1950, former Office of Strategic Service 
Director William Donovan recommended 
that the administration support the 
development of the Mekong Basin as a long-
range project to secure cooperation between 
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam.  This concept presented to ECAFE, 
and in 1957, the Committee for the 
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Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin established.  In 1958, 
Washington provided US$2 million to help 
finance the collection of primary data in the 
area.  The State Department viewed the 
Mekong Committee as having enormous 
potential for the political and economic 
future of the region, ‘in determining whether 
Southeast Asia remains free or comes under 
the control of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’ (Memo, 
Landon to Rostow, 1961). 
By the early 1960s, there were some 
regional organizations in existence, but only 
a few with solely Asian membership.  The 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) - an 
economic and cultural organization that 
included Malaya, the Philippines, and 
Thailand - was one such organization.  It 
founded in 1961, yet its functions limited, 
especially when the Philippines refused to 
recognize the newly created Federation of 
Malaysia, because of a Philippine claim to 
the British Borneo territory of Sabah.  
Another organization was Maphilindo, for 
Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia.  Its 
purpose was to unite the Malay world, and 
arose out of the Manila Agreement, a report 
by the Foreign Ministers of those countries, 
accepted and augmented by the three heads 
of government in meetings in Manila in July 
and August 1963.  They agreed that foreign 
bases should not undermine their 
independence, although Maphilindo came to 
nothing because of the outbreak of 
Confrontation, and Manila’s claim to Sabah 
(Minute, Mare to Mr. Samuel, 23 January 
1967). 
American Initiatives 
Under President Johnson, the 
Department of State continued to pursue 
regional cooperation as a policy objective, 
supporting two main goals in Southeast Asia 
as interdependent: security and social and 
economic development (Administrative 
History of the Department of State, 1963- 
1969).  In early 1965, State Department 
advisers suggested to Under-Secretary of 
State George Ball, that some Asian 
development defense agency, or 
organization, might be initiated to replace 
existing groups.  Ball agreed to consider such 
an approach (Conversation between Ball and 
Talbot, 1965).  However, many in 
Washington were wary that this policy 
would portray as American interference.  In 
April 1965, Chester L. Cooper, a staff 
member of the National Security Council 
(NSC), suggested that Washington should 
present to UN Secretary General, U Thant, 
the idea of forming a new regional 
institution called, The Southeast Asia 
Development Association.  It would be a 
coordinating and consultative organization 
with permanent staff and an executive agent 
for the management of multi-national capital 
projects, and the concept must appear to be 
an Asian initiative and be Asian (Talking 
Points for Bundy from Cooper). 
Many officials felt that regional 
cooperation was to be an Asian idea, 
privately Washington attributed main part 
of its implementation to American money.  
Johnson’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 
claimed that one important step towards 
regional cooperation was the provision of 
US$1 billion for economic development in 
Asia, as outlined in a speech delivered by 
President Johnson at Johns Hopkins 
University.  Another important step was 
directing this US$1 billion towards the 
establishment of the Asia Development Bank 
(ADB) and other regional programs (Rusk to 
Rev. Dusen, 1965). 
Journal of ASEAN Studies  5 
 
Until Confrontation ended, regional 
security cooperation was unfeasible.  
However, economic development could be a 
means to end that dispute, and improve 
relations between Indonesia and other 
Southeast Asian countries, especially 
Malaysia and Singapore.  When Washington 
commented favorably on Maphilindo as an 
organization that might provide the means 
of promoting regional cooperation and of 
finding a solution to Confrontation, 
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 
expressed his concern that the U.S. was 
supporting the resurrection of Maphilindo. 
Department of State officials told Lee that 
Maphilindo was an Asian and not an 
American initiative and that the State 
Department did not want any plans for trade 
and security cooperation perceived as 
American interference (Washington to 
Singapore, 1965). 
By mid-1966, some regional and sub-
regional cooperative initiative had evolved 
such as the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) – 
an economic and cultural alliance made up 
of non-communist countries within the 
region, the ADB and the ASA.  State 
Department officials believed these bodies 
were promising for future progress in 
regional and sub-regional cooperation that 
would, in turn, led to collective efforts at 
solving economic, social and security 
problems in Asia (Memo for Rostow from 
Jorden, 1966).  Donald D. Ropa of the NSC 
Staff stressed to National Security Adviser, 
Walt Rostow in April 1966 that American 
security interests in the Pacific basin would 
be dependent on more regional cooperation 
for economic development and political 
cooperation for mutual security concerns.  
The ASA or Maphilindo might be able to 
evolve as a wider cooperative group, 
depending on Indonesia’s participation.  
Consideration would then have to be taken 
as to the form and substance of such a group, 
what its relationship would be with other 
regional organizations and in what direction 
would American diplomatic initiatives 
follow in furthering the idea (Memo from 
Ropa to Rostow, 1966). 
Continuing American interest in 
Asian economic development and regional 
security cooperation continued as Johnson 
made a trip to the region in October-
November 1966.  There he met with the 
heads of six nations – Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of 
Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand – in 
Manila on October 24-25.  This meeting 
closed with a declaration of Peace and 
Progress in Asia and the Pacific and all seven 
heads of government declared strong 
support for the principle of regional 
cooperation (Administrative History of the 
Department of State, 1963-1969). 
British Support and the End of 
Confrontation 
London also supported regional 
cooperation for Southeast Asia, especially 
considering Britain’s military commitments 
to the region.  In early 1964, the British 
Embassy in Washington delivered an Aide 
Memoire to the White House posting that 
Western withdrawal from Vietnam or 
Malaysia was inevitable and if there was any 
chance of stabilizing an independent 
Southeast Asia without the presence of 
Western forces, regional cooperation was an 
undeniable attraction.  This withdrawal was 
an ideal situation in the long-term, but it was 
not possible in the short-term, especially due 
to the leftist chaos of Indonesia (British 
Embassy in Washington Aide Memoire, 
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1964).  However, the British did not present 
any ideas on how to progress this issue.  In 
May 1965, Rusk suggested to his British 
counterpart, Michael Stewart, that 
Washington and London should do more to 
encourage Southeast Asian countries to 
cooperate. With the aim of reducing British 
or American military involvement in the 
region, suggesting the establishment of an 
organization around Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand (Record of 
discussion, Rusk, and Stewart, 1965). 
Some Southeast Asian states 
supported the departure of Western military 
bases from the region, but not all.  
Indonesian leader, General Suharto 
reportedly said in February 1966 that the 
defense of Southeast Asia was a matter for 
the countries in the area and that the British 
military base in Singapore was a target for 
China’s expansionism.  The Malaysian and 
Singapore governments, on the other hand, 
wanted the base to stay (Kuala Lumpur to 
Ottawa, 1966).  Nevertheless, cooperation 
between the Southeast Asian nations was 
required.  London was quite keen on the 
establishment of an organization like the 
defunct Maphilindo, with the addition of 
Singapore.  However, the Malaysians were 
less sure of resurrecting this organization.  
Kuala Lumpur’s preference was for the ASA, 
which would include Thailand.  Regardless 
of the form such an association would take, 
London’s position was to support any new 
organization that might emerge from the 
Bangkok talks between Malaysia and 
Indonesia on ending Confrontation (Memo, 
Pritchard to Lord Beswick, 1966).  Britain 
was uncertain whether a regional 
organization would discuss at these 
meetings; however, it instructed its missions 
in the region to stress its approval for some 
form of regional cooperation in Southeast 
Asia that would be worked out by the 
participating countries (London to certain 
missions, 1966).  Then London could plan for 
the withdrawal of its forces from Singapore. 
While Washington wanted the British 
military bases to stay for at least the 
immediate future, the hope of some U.S. 
officials was that out of the regional 
initiatives implemented in the early 1960s. 
The initiatives would uniquely be Asian 
mutual security arrangements, buttressed by 
American power presence, which will 
compensate for ultimate British withdrawal 
(Ropa to Rostow, 1966). 
Formal Initiatives and the Creation of 
ASEAN 
It informally agreed at the Bangkok 
talks that Indonesia should join an ASA-type 
body that would give a new name (Kuala 
Lumpur to London, 1966). Indonesia was 
keen to see that foreign forces withdraw 
from the region and new Indonesian 
President Suharto wanted closer ties with his 
neighbors to help stem the spread of China’s 
influence in the area (Jakarta to Washington, 
1966).  He told two British Members of 
Parliament that an Asian community should 
be responsible for the security of Southeast 
Asia (Meeting, Jackson MP, Dalyell MP, and 
General Suharto, 1966). Thai Prime Minister 
Thanom Kittikachorn and Malaysian Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said that 
they were pleased that countries in the 
region were increasingly aware of the need 
for regional cooperation, and stressed their 
determination to make a Southeast Asian 
association work (Kuala Lumpur to 
Washington, 1966).  Malaya had been the 
initiator of ASA and was a participant of 
Maphilindo, and was now, like Malaysia, 
willing to join a regional organization that 
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would include members of Singapore.  The 
Australian High Commission in Kuala 
Lumpur saw the possibility that a new local 
organization would make Malaysia less 
dependent on its non-Asian allies (Kuala 
Lumpur to Canberra, 1966).  Malaysian 
Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin explained to 
U.S. officials that the American nuclear 
umbrella and a Southeast Asian regional 
organization were the only two alternatives 
to avoid the spread of communist influence 
(Kuala Lumpur to Washington, 1966). 
The Malaysian Government 
specifically, agreed with continued Western 
support in Southeast Asia.  During a meeting 
between Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak and U.S. Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara in Washington, Razak 
said that from Malaysia’s perspective, it was 
important to have Laos, Burma, Cambodia, 
and Thailand coordinating policy to keep 
any pressure from China away from 
Malaysia’s borders.  McNamara then 
emphasized the importance that the U.S. 
attached to the creation of some form of 
regional grouping so that American forces 
could eventually withdraw from the Asian 
mainland (Washington to Kuala Lumpur, 
1966).  In Thailand, Thai Foreign Minister 
Thanat Khoman had told Humphrey, he 
wanted to gather representatives from non-
communist Asian countries to promote 
increased regional cooperation.  The 
Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, and 
the South Korean President, Park Chung-
hee, backed this sentiment (Letter, Vice-
president to Johnson, 1966).  However, 
Thanat did not want overt American 
support.  He told Rusk that he hoped 
regional development could have America’s 
discreet blessing.  When the Secretary of 
State asked if Bangkok did not want U.S. 
support to be too obvious, Thanat replied 
that he was sure Washington would be able 
to determine where and when it could 
provide useful assistance (Record of 
conversation between Rusk and Khoman, 
1966). 
However, problems arose over 
whether the organization would involve 
itself in regional defense.  Malik stressed to 
the American Ambassador in Jakarta in early 
1967 that the new regional group would only 
be an economic, cultural and technical 
association and that defense matters would 
not consider; although in time ASEAN 
would take on a more political role (Jakarta 
to Canberra, 1967).  However, one defense 
matter that was discusses was the presence 
of foreign military bases in the region.  
Indonesia was opposed to such bases and 
wanted this reflected in the new 
organization’s declaration.  This opposition 
had been an aim of the previous regime in 
Jakarta and had been part of Sukarno’s anti-
imperialist rhetoric during Confrontation.  
For the apparent pro-Western Suharto 
government, the motivations for opposing 
foreign bases seemed less clear.  However, in 
early 1967, officials told Australian and 
British representatives that the Indonesian 
military stood to gain significantly if 
countries in the region opted out of defense 
arrangements with non-regional powers and 
instead organized their defense plans with 
the participation of Indonesia (NIC 303(74), 
First Draft, 1974).  Although, the Acting 
Director of Asian Regional Affairs at the 
State Department, Philip Manhard, also told 
the Australians that it was difficult to 
determine how far Malik was interested in 
ASEAN taking on a security role and 
whether the Indonesian Army was pushing 
for this position.  Manhard pointed out that 
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in a recent speech, Malik had denied that the 
new regional grouping would have a 
security role, but had then made 
contradictory statements, commenting that 
regional security had discussed amongst the 
five nations (Washington to Canberra, 1967). 
Back in May 1967, Malik asked whether 
proposals for the new regional organization 
would include a joint military security plan 
against communist infiltration, he replied 
that regional cooperation along the lines of 
economic, cultural and technical 
partnerships could interpret as a form of 
defense (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1967). 
When ASEAN was inaugurated on 8 
August 1967, the State Department regarded 
the formation of ASEAN as a positive move, 
despite the indication that member nations 
would not welcome any form of outside 
interference, and not just from China.  
Washington was not overly concerned about 
the paragraph relating to foreign bases, 
believing the negotiations had largely 
avoided contentious political issues 
(Washington to Canberra, 1967).  The Soviets 
denounced ASEAN, labelling it a new 
military group and China completely 
ignored the new organization.  ASEAN’s 
declaration stated that the countries in 
Southeast Asia would cooperate on 
economic, social and cultural development.  
The founding countries also declared their 
commitment to stabilizing and securing the 
region from external interference (Gill, 1997, 
pp. 30-33).  The declaration added that all 
foreign bases were temporary and that the 
countries in the region shared the main 
responsibility for defending Southeast Asia, 
although ASEAN was not directly concerned 
with defense.  Of the five founding members, 
Indonesia was the only country that did not 
have Western forces inside its territory, and 
Jakarta insisted on a statement reflecting the 
temporary nature of Western bases in the 
region.  For Indonesia, the declaration must 
refer to the foreign bases, and stipulate that 
the region was responsible for its defense.  
However, the other four nations also did not 
emphasize ASEAN as a security 
organization (Canberra to all posts, 1967).  
Indeed, days later, when the Soviet 
Ambassador to Thailand asked Thanat about 
the issue of bases, he responded that the 
military bases stationed in Thailand was 
Thai and not American and that the U.S. was 
only needed to use these bases in the face of 
North Vietnamese aggression (Washington 
to Canberra, 1967). 
The Australian Government, on the 
other hand, seemed to view the organization 
as a forum to promote security in the region.  
A day after ASEAN’s inauguration, 
Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, 
Paul Hasluck, praised the new association 
and its aims at increasing cooperation 
amongst the member states.  He added that 
ASEAN not only had committed to support 
economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region but to 
also ‘promote regional peace and stability’ – 
objectives that had the full support of 
Canberra (Canberra to certain posts, 1967).  
Years later, in his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew 
wrote that the unspoken objective of ASEAN 
was to build strength through regional 
solidarity before a power vacuum was 
created because of the British military 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia and a 
possible American one later (Yew, 2000, 
p.369). 
The Early Years of ASEAN 
However, in the early years of 
ASEAN, the organization was loosely 
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structured, and Singapore was the only 
member state that gained any great financial 
benefit.  The Singaporeans pushed for issues 
such as tourism, shipping, fishing and intra-
regional trade to be considered by the first 
meeting of the ASEAN standing committee, 
hoping that these economic projects would 
lead to closer involvement in regional 
planning.  However, four of the five 
founding members – Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines – had similar and 
competed for agricultural economies and 
economic nationalism was expected to be a 
major hurdle for the new organization.  
Singapore was the country best suited 
economically to a regional arrangement.  As 
a result, the Australian Government’s 
assessment of the benefit of ASEAN was that 
it would carry more significance in the 
political rather than the economic sphere 
(Canberra to all posts, 1967).  Indeed, this 
view was reflected in the outcome to internal 
tension within the organization through 
Manila’s ongoing claim to Sabah that caused 
the breakdown of Philippine-Malaysian 
diplomatic relations in 1968.  ASEAN 
encouraged a resolution of the crisis and 
Indonesia was given credit for acting as an 
effective mediator (Talking points for 
meeting with Malik, by Kissinger, 24 
September 1974). However, the approach 
was essentially one of non-interference in 
member disputes, reflecting the way ASEAN 
tackled both external and internal pressures 
through a philosophy of non-interference 
and consensus (Tarling, 2006, p. 210). 
Debate on the future role of ASEAN 
emerged at a meeting of foreign ministers in 
December 1969.  The opening statements 
from some ministers revealed emerging 
issues on whether the organization would 
deal solely with economic and cultural 
cooperation, or try to forge ahead into the 
security arena.  Singaporean Foreign 
Minister, S. Rajaratnam, stated that his 
government believed ASEAN should stay 
solely focused on economic cooperation in 
Southeast Asia. Whereas Malik referred to 
Britain’s military withdrawal and a 
prospective American disengagement as 
cause for the member states to ‘induce us to 
jointly consider policies in our effort to cope 
with the new emerging situation.’  Thanat 
Khoman also mentioned security concerns, 
which was reiterated by the Malaysians, 
stating that there was scope to work out 
some form of security arrangements and that 
member countries should take responsibility 
for their region following any power 
vacuum left by departing Western forces 
(Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1969). 
Fueling these security concerns was 
the announcement in January 1968 of 
Britain’s intention to withdraw all its 
military forces from Southeast Asia by 1971 
and U.S. President Nixon’s statement on the 
island of Guam in July 1969 that the U.S. 
expected Asian nations to assume more 
responsibility for their defense.  America 
would keep all existing treaty commitments, 
but would not enter any new ones, unless 
they were vital to the interests of the U.S.  In 
the case of internal subversion in Asia, 
assistance from Washington would not be in 
the form of troops, but development aid, 
military equipment, and training (Record of 
meeting between Wilson and Nixon, 1969). 
Later in the Philippines, Nixon 
nevertheless continued to stress the 
importance of economic development as a 
vehicle for increased stability in Asia.  In a 
statement, the American President reiterated 
U.S. was backing for the ADB saying that he 
had asked Congress to appropriate US$20 
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million for the ordinary capital of the ADB 
and US$25 million to its special fund for the 
following fiscal year.  He also stressed that 
the Bank was an Asian institution with its 
headquarters in Asia and with a requirement 
that 60 per cent of its capital must come from 
Asia. While the U.S. and other non-Asian 
countries could play a role, the leadership of 
the Bank must always come from Asia 
(Nixon Statement, 1969). Then, a few weeks 
later, Secretary of State William Rogers 
supported Nixon’s position in a speech to the 
media in Canberra.  He stressed that 
American policy in Asia would be to 
encourage Asian leaders to meet their own 
internal security needs with material 
assistance from the U.S. and to encourage 
‘rapid economic development of the area 
with emphasis on increasing regional 
cooperation’ (Rogers speech, 1969).  Nixon 
publicly announced in January 1970 his 
proposal to ask Congress to authorize a 
contribution of US$100 million to the ADB’s 
Special Funds over a three-year period – 
US$25 million in the first fiscal year, and then 
US$35 million and US$40 million in the 
following two fiscal years.  He stressed that 
since the ADB’s establishment, the bank had 
made a major contribution to Asian 
economic development and that it provided 
a ‘unique capability for acting as a catalyst 
for regional cooperation’ (White House Press 
Statement, 1970). 
However, officials American 
Embassy in Singapore warned Washington 
that if Southeast Asian regionalism were to 
be successful, nations there must be sure that 
the U.S. would not abandon them (Singapore 
to Washington, 1969).  Kissinger too stressed 
this position to the American Vice-President 
in December 1969, before Spiro Agnew’s 
proposed to visit the region.  During the visit 
to Indonesia, Kissinger told Agnew that he 
should stress that Jakarta’s pursuit of 
regional economic policies and multilateral 
economic aid approaches justified America’s 
aid program to Indonesia (Memo, Kissinger 
to Agnew, 1969).  Indeed, by the end of 1969, 
the administration in Washington had 
noticed that Asian nations were starting to 
rely less on individual outside aid donors. 
The Asian begin to rely more on multilateral 
aid organizations such as the ADB and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and that 
the Americans welcomed the creation of 
other Asian organizations based on Asian 
initiatives.  Therefore, while the U.S. did not 
want to interfere, it would be willing to assist 
multilateral and regional organizations 
where possible (Memo, East Asia and the 
Pacific, 1969). 
The Changing Regional Scene 
Overall, the response of Southeast 
Asian leaders to Nixon’s comments was that 
they viewed the so-called Nixon Doctrine as 
a warning signal that the U.S. would 
eventually disengage from the Asian 
mainland and regional allies must assume 
greater responsibility for their security.  For 
some regional nations, the American policy 
announcement was in step with current 
aspirations, such as Bangkok’s efforts to 
move towards a more independent foreign 
policy path and Manila’s wish to move 
beyond the traditional image as an American 
strategic client (Acharya, 2012, p. 140). The 
Australian Embassy in Manila reported that 
the Philippines appeared to be in favor of 
Southeast Asian nations becoming more self-
reliant.  Philippine President Marcos’s 
proposal for an Asian forum to ‘solve Asian 
problems’ and his foreign secretary’s 
references to Asian security arrangements 
indicated that Manila acknowledged the 
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changing role of future American 
involvement in Southeast Asia and admitted 
that the Philippines would become more 
involved regionally (Manila to Canberra, 
1970). 
Thanat Khoman told the Australians 
that he believed China would become a more 
serious problem after the end of the war in 
Vietnam and that countries in the region had 
only two alternatives: either submit to China 
or unify and develop a front, which the 
Chinese would have to accept.  A pact was 
not necessary for this purpose, instead of 
regional cooperation based on mutual 
understanding and self-interest was all that 
was needed (Bangkok to Canberra, 1969).  
However, a year later, the Thai Government 
seemed to recognize that regional 
cooperation alone would not provide in the 
immediate future any prospect of an 
alternative security backing.  This 
recognition was because of the disparity of 
power between countries in the region, the 
internal instability in most Asian nations and 
Bangkok’s reluctance to accept the risks that 
would be involved in any new mutual 
security arrangement.  Nevertheless, 
regional cooperation potentially provided an 
opportunity for Thailand to supplement its 
security alliance with the U.S. by 
underpinning political and economic ties 
with its neighbors (NIC Note 4/70, 1970).  
This assessment was made a few months 
after Thailand secured additional financial 
assistance from Washington.  In August 
1971, Nixon directed that a US$45 million 
special assistance packaged negotiated with 
Bangkok to strengthen the Thai economy 
and defense capabilities.  The Americans 
hoped this would accelerate the 
improvement of Thai armed forces 
capabilities so that they might be capable of 
facing any possible contingencies (Memo 
126, 1971). 
Malaysia’s reaction to Nixon’s 
declaration was to support bilateral 
relationships between countries of the region 
but without treaty ties or another 
institutionalization.  This policy stemmed 
from the announcement of not just the Nixon 
Doctrine, but also the British intention to 
withdraw militarily. Kuala Lumpur’s doubts 
about the utility of the newly formed Five-
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 
between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Malaysia, as well as limited 
expectations of Australian and New Zealand 
assistance (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 
1970). 
Singapore’s response to the changed 
strategic environment was to build its 
defense forces, but these efforts were not a 
direct reaction to the so-called doctrine, 
although Singapore’s efforts for closer 
cooperation in defense matters with 
Malaysia could have been encouraged by it.  
However, since the British announcement, 
Singapore had been building its military due 
to its geographical proximity to Malaysia 
and Indonesia (Singapore to Canberra, 1970). 
The Indonesians seemed to accept 
much of what was outlined by Washington 
and emphasized the need for extensive 
foreign aid to counter the military weakness 
of the countries in the region.  In fact, the 
concept of increased economic development 
to replace a foreign military presence suited 
the government in Jakarta that was quick to 
point out that Indonesia lacked the capacity 
to contribute to the joint defense and military 
security.  Rather its priority was economic 
development (Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, 
Singapore to Canberra, 1970).  Nevertheless, 
12  The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism 
 
Indonesia became the beneficiary of an 
expanded U.S. military aid program when 
Washington approved in March 1970 
contributions of approximately $15 million 
U.S. dollars per year – an increase of $10 
million from the original budget (Kissinger 
memo for Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Defense, 1970).  Jakarta was hoping for yet 
more and that the Americans would not 
depart any earlier than 1973 and would leave 
no security vacuum.  Suharto sent General 
Sumitro to Washington in July 1970 to ask for 
more military aid, and during discussions 
with Nixon’s National Security Adviser, 
Henry Kissinger, he stressed that Indonesia 
was not yet a ‘real power’ and was still 
unable to take over the responsibility of 
security in Southeast Asia.  Furthermore, the 
Indonesian Government had not intended to 
expand its armed forces before 1973, instead 
deciding to concentrate on economic 
development and ‘sacrifice’ security for the 
sake of national reconstruction.  Jakarta was 
worried that its neighbors – Thailand, 
Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia – 
lacked the military power to withstand 
potential internal instability, or stand up to 
intensive Soviet diplomacy.  Besides, these 
Asian nations might turn to the Soviet side to 
counter Chinese infiltration.  Therefore, 
Indonesia now had to develop strong armed 
forces and hoped to acquire military 
supplies from Western Europe and the U.S. 
(Memo of Conversation between Sumitro 
and Kissinger, 1970). Kissinger responded 
very positively to Sumitro, stating that, ‘we 
recognized the Indonesian role, precisely 
what the Nixon Doctrine required 
(Memorandum of Conversation between 
Sumitro and Kissinger, 1970). 
Although the Americans did not 
presume that Indonesia’s request for more 
arms was out of regional altruism, Jakarta 
was extremely keen to secure funds for six C-
130 planes, and an M-16 rifle factory and 
American officials noted that they might 
have used their support for and participation 
in regional cooperation as part of their bid.  
NSC staff member, John H. Holdridge raised 
that possibility with Henry Kissinger, before 
adding that while there was still no 
movement towards a regional security 
arrangement in Southeast Asia, ‘the 
Indonesians might just be able to get things 
going’ (Memorandum, John H. Holdridge to 
Kissinger, 1970).  Nixon authorized an 
increase in military aid to Indonesia to $18 
million for the 1971 fiscal year 
(Memorandum, Holdridge and Kennedy to 
Kissinger, 1970). 
The Australian Government was also 
hopeful that Jakarta would pursue a greater 
interest in a collective security for Southeast 
Asia, despite Suharto’s preoccupation with 
the economy and internal disputes along 
with the continuation of the Indonesian 
position of non-alignment.  Malik’s efforts to 
arrange an international conference in 
Jakarta in 1970 on how to bring peace to 
Cambodia was the cause of these high hopes 
in Canberra. The officials believed that the 
Jakarta Conference on Cambodia revealed 
the Indonesian Government’s willingness to 
take a leading role in regional security (NIC 
1(70), 1970). 
Britain as well recognized the 
importance of Indonesia as an emerging 
leader in Southeast Asia.  In 1971, the British 
Ambassador in Jakarta urged the British 
Government to acknowledge the growing 
importance of Indonesia to regional stability.  
He wrote to the Foreign Office that the long-
term security of British investments in 
Malaysia and Singapore depended on the 
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fortunes of Indonesia and hoped that 
London would steadily increase its aid 
program there.  Ambassador Combs felt that 
the Indonesians viewed their position in 
Southeast Asia, as resident guarantors of 
stability in the region, were keen supporters 
of ASEAN and were increasingly likely to 
take the lead on regional policies (Combs, to 
Foreign Office, 1971).  In early 1969, London 
was providing £200 million a year on aid and 
technical assistance to the Far East.  While 
this support was mostly bilateral, the British 
placed a lot of emphasis on multilateral aid 
to Southeast Asia and the opportunities it 
presented for regional cooperation.  In doing 
so had played a role in many regional bodies 
such as the Colombo Plan, the ADB, the 
Mekong Committee, and the specialized 
institutions of the UN (Speech, Maclehosesp, 
1969). 
The Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality 
As the level of American and British 
military involvement in Southeast Asia 
declined, the five ASEAN countries started 
to pay closer attention to political and 
security issues.  However, each of these 
nations had different security arrangements.  
Thailand and the Philippines were members 
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), and the Philippines had a security 
treaty with the U.S., Malaysia, and Singapore 
were members of the FPDA.  Indonesia had 
no security deals but shared joint-military 
arrangements with Malaysia.  Nevertheless, 
there was a new attitude towards a 
reassessment of past policies and practices in 
an aim to seek more regional independence.   
As a result, ideas of some neutral area 
presented as a solution to the changed 
security environment in Southeast Asia.  The 
Malaysians proposed a neutralization 
concept, while the Indonesians, Thai, 
Filipinos, and Singaporeans showed their 
preference for a zone of peace, freedom and 
neutrality (NIC 124(72), 1972). 
These proposals first discussed at a 
meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in 
Kuala Lumpur in November 1971.  At this 
venue, the Malaysians sought an agreement 
that all foreign powers should be excluded 
from Southeast Asia, that the region should 
not use as a theatre for international power 
struggles, and that the great powers – the 
U.S., Soviet Union, and China – would 
guarantee this.  This proposal was 
unacceptable to the four other 
representatives at the meeting.  They did not 
want to see a certain reference to 
‘neutralization’ or great power guarantees.  
The meeting’s declaration reflected this.  In 
the end, the meeting stated that the ASEAN 
nations would make all necessary efforts to 
enable Southeast Asia to be recognized as a 
zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality that 
was free from any form of interference by 
outside powers.  The regional nations would 
also make every effort to increase 
cooperation amongst themselves (Canberra 
to Australian posts, 1972). 
However, each member state had 
different aspirations regarding security in 
Southeast Asia and their existing bilateral 
relationships.  For the Malaysians, ZOPFN 
was a means to achieve domestic security 
without cooperative arrangements with non-
regional or regional states (NIC 303(74), 
1974).  For the other four ASEAN nations, 
external security guarantees still viewed as 
necessary.  Thailand and the Philippines 
continued to place importance on the U.S. as 
their main protecting power.  Singapore, 
with an economy oriented to manufacturing 
and exporting, on the other, hand believed 
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its interests were best served by an open-
door policy for all the great powers, and not 
only one powerful ally.  Indonesia saw itself 
as playing an independent role in the region, 
which involved encouraging its neighbors to 
strengthen their security systems as well as 
practice closer regional cooperation.  At the 
same time, Jakarta also placed a lot of 
reliance on its relationship with the U.S. for 
both economic assistance and a guarantee of 
regional security (NIC 124(72), First Draft, 
1972). 
By 1973, ZOPFAN continued to exist 
as a mere statement of intent rather than any 
concrete framework.  Indonesia, especially, 
was in no hurry to see the implementation of 
the neutralization proposal because of its 
wish for a continued U.S. military presence 
(Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 1975).  Singapore 
also supported American military presence 
in the region and during a visit to the U.S. in 
March 1973, Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the 
benefits to achieving the long-term objective 
of a quadripartite balance between U.S., 
Soviet Union, Japan and Western naval 
forces.  In turn, the neutralization concept 
did not appear to be a factor severely 
affected by the U.S. military planning in the 
region, nor did it halt the flow of American 
economic and military assistance (NIC 
57(73), 1973).  Indeed, ZOPFAN reflected the 
changes taking place in Southeast Asia that 
the ASEAN nations were unable to 
influence, as they were unable to agree on 
what would be the future role of the external 
powers (Narine, 1998, pp. 198-201).  Towards 
the end of the decade, the Malaysians had 
lost interest in the concept, as had the other 
ASEAN member states (Response to 
Proposed Parliamentary Question, 1977). 
Diversification 
Despite the signings of ZOPFAN, 
and an agreement in 1973 to establish a 
Permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, 
Washington felt pressure from within 
Southeast Asia. Notably, Thailand and the 
Philippines, retain SEATO as a symbol of 
American presence in the region during its 
transitional period of disengagement 
(Buszynsky, 1981, pp. 287-296). However, 
Bangkok and Manila did agree to abandon 
the military component of SEATO in 
response to Australian and New Zealand 
pressure on Washington to downgrade the 
alliance as a price of their continued 
membership. 
The issue of a changing role for 
SEATO raised during a meeting with Nixon 
and the SEATO General Secretary, General 
Sunthorn, just days before the September 
1973 SEATO Council meeting.  During the 
former, when Sunthorn suggested that 
SEATO could play a future role in 
supplementing bilateral aid programs in 
Asia, Nixon replied, ‘that can give meaning 
to the organization.  The military is very 
important, but this is also helpful’ (Memo of 
conversation, President Nixon and General 
Sunthorn, 1973).  At the 18th SEATO Council 
meeting of 28 September 1973, all delegates 
agreed to abolish the military structure of 
SEATO, except military exercises. 
Canberra’s pressure to downgrade 
SEATO reflected the regional policy aims of 
the Australian Prime Minister, Gough 
Whitlam.  When he first came to office in 
1972, Whitlam endorsed proposals for 
neutralization of the Indian Ocean and 
Southeast Asia, sought to withdraw 
Australian forces from Vietnam, praised the 
Guam Doctrine and Nixon’s moves towards 
détente with China and the Soviet Union, 
and showed little support for the FPDA or 
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SEATO.  For Whitlam, supporting regional 
cooperation would be one of the main 
elements of Australia’s foreign policy for the 
1970s with less emphasis on military pacts 
(Briefing Paper, 1974). This increased 
emphasis on regionalism and cooperation 
between the superpowers led to calls from 
Whitlam to propose an Asian and Pacific 
organization that would eventually include 
China’s membership.  The idea would be to 
bring the Asia-Pacific nations closer without 
the interference of the major powers (The 
Hobart Mercury, 1973).  Such an 
organization was not supposed to replace 
SEATO, ASPAC or ASEAN, nor was it to 
transform these organizations.  Rather, 
Whitlam attempted to propose new ideas 
about regional cooperation (Letter, Paris to 
Canberra, 1973). 
The Singaporeans also had visions of 
other regional groupings. Rajaratnam told 
his Australian counterpart during a meeting 
in Canberra in November 1973 that while a 
long-term objective for his government was 
a larger regional group, this would come 
about with the assistance of the formation of 
some smaller sub-regional groupings.  
Suggestions for these sub-groups were the 
possibility of a smaller organization made of 
up of Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and 
Papua New Guinea, and creating a group for 
the four Commonwealth countries in the 
region.  These groups would run alongside 
ASEAN and the FPDA, strengthening 
Southeast Asian unity (Record of 
Conversation, Rajaratnam and Willesee, 
1973). 
The End of the War in Vietnam 
The end of the war in Vietnam and 
the withdrawal of American forces paved 
the way to closer cooperation between some 
Southeast Asian nations.  During the 1975 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the discussion 
was dominated by the implication of the 
political changes in Indochina.  Ministers 
expressed optimism and caution and 
concluded that the war’s end provided hope 
for securing peace, progress, and stability in 
Southeast Asia and decided to initiate 
friendly relations with the Indochina nations 
(Draft Paper, 1975). 
At the first meeting of Heads of 
ASEAN governments in Bali in February 
1976, members reiterated the commitment to 
the organization and at a subsequent 
meeting of economic ministers; the 
agreement reached on the establishment of 
an industry in each member country where 
there would be joint equity participation that 
would be developed to benefit the region.  
The Philippines then suggested the 
establishment of an ASEAN common 
market; however, this proposal was only 
supported by Singapore.  Instead, 
discussions commenced on whether to set 
up a system of preferential tariffs.  By the 
mid-1970s, ASEAN members had also 
started cooperating closely in international 
bodies, coordinating votes at the UN and 
representations to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) on economic matters 
(Response to Proposed Parliamentary 
Question, 1977).  Significantly, member 
states obtained from the EEC recognition of 
ASEAN as one region and preferential access 
to certain commodities into EEC markets, 
strengthening relations between the two 
regional blocs (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974). 
ASEAN also pursued external economic 
support from wider regional states, security 
some joint economic cooperation projects 
with Australia, and seeking similar 
cooperation with New Zealand and Canada.  
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Japan also started expressing a willingness to 
undertake joint economic ventures with the 
regional group, despite earlier refusals to do 
so (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974). 
Despite closer cooperation 
economically and diplomatically, ASEAN 
member states continued, ten years after the 
association’s inauguration, to differ as for 
whether ASEAN should pursue security 
objectives.  Indonesia was one of the stronger 
supporters of security cooperation amongst 
members, but even Jakarta was concerned 
about the organization presenting an image 
of a defensive alliance.  Thus, most military 
cooperation in the region remained bilateral 
and at the 1976 ASEAN summit in Bali, 
leaders agreed to continue to cooperate on 
security matters, on a non-ASEAN basis 
(Memo, U.S. Interests, and Objectives in the 
Asia-Pacific Region, 1976). 
Independence and non-alignment 
were a major goal for ASEAN members 
regarding security cooperation; however, 
relations with Vietnam also shaped defense 
issues, as there was a consensus among the 
member’s states not to confirm Vietnamese 
suspicions that ASEAN would become the 
next SEATO.  Hanoi’s position was that 
while it was prepared to develop bilateral 
relations with ASEAN member states, it was 
not willing to deal with ASEAN as an 
Association.  In turn, the Southeast Asian 
member nations in ASEAN, despite 
increased cooperation within the 
organization as well as continued 
aspirations for independence and non-
alignment, sought continuing American 
involvement in their region as a deterrent to 
the Soviet Union and Chinese strategic 
ambitions as well as Japanese economic 
domination (FCO paper, 1977). 
After the second summit meeting of 
ASEAN heads of Government in Kuala 
Lumpur on 1977, ASEAN leaders 
maintained the level of cooperation in 
economic areas and took steps to increase 
cooperation in cultural and social fields.  One 
of the most substantial areas of progress was 
in ASEAN’s external relations through 
discussions with the Prime Ministers of 
Australia, Japan and New Zealand on 
common foreign policy and especially 
foreign economic policy.  As Lee Kuan Yew 
pointed out in his closing statement at the 
meeting, ‘it is psychologically easier to deal 
with ASEAN’s external partners than to sort 
out intra-regional arrangements between the 
partners themselves.’ These arrangements 
are an indication that ASEAN nations would 
continue to value both cooperation within 
the Association while maintaining their 
external relationships (ASEAN Information 
Paper, 1977). 
Conclusion 
Policy objectives from inside the 
countries and outside of Southeast Asia 
towards regional cooperation and security 
had been developing since the end of the 
Second World War. Economic development 
viewed as essential for containing 
communist influence and preventing 
internal insurgencies in the region.  Regional 
cooperation was one way of providing 
financial assistance to newly independent 
nations without the appearance of foreign 
interference in regional affairs.  The aim for 
many of the countries involved in Southeast 
Asian regionalism was that growth and 
prosperity would come through regional 
development programs with external 
support.  This program would then expand 
to some form of collective security led by the 
Southeast Asian nations themselves.  This 
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policy started to gather pace during the 
1950s and 1960s.  By the late 1950s, the U.S. 
administration was strongly promoting the 
UN Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East as one of the most important 
multilateral groupings in promoting 
regional economic and social cooperation 
and development.  In 1950, the U.S. 
supported the development of the Mekong 
Basin as a long-range project to secure 
regional cooperation between Burma, 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 
the early 1960s, the U.S. tried to promote 
regional cooperation in Asia by urging closer 
Japanese relations with other countries in the 
region, initially through the Association of 
Southeast Asia.  Key to this plan was the role 
that the regional nations would play 
themselves. For Western countries, regional 
cooperation not only potentially provided a 
vehicle for containing communism in Asia, 
but the policy presented an alternative 
security system in replace of Western 
military bases.  Southeast Asian nations 
themselves supported closer regional 
integration as a means of containing Chinese 
communist influences and for countering the 
decline of Western military support.  The 
inauguration of ASEAN paved the way for a 
formal regional association to bring some 
Southeast Asian nations together, and 
although the organization’s initial aim was 
claimed to be socioeconomic collaboration, 
political factors such as the promotion of 
regional peace and stability were present 
from the beginning. Therefore, while formal 
regional cooperation came directly out of 
initiatives from Southeast Asian leaders, it 
did not end continued Western financial 
support to local institutions, nor did it end 
external bilateral security relationships. In 
the early years of ASEAN, Asian initiatives 
towards economic development and 
security relations continued to be supported 
by foreign powers. 
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